By Alberto Voltolini
This e-book provides a unique idea of fictional entities that's syncretistic insofar because it integrates the paintings of prior authors. It places ahead a brand new metaphysical perception of the character of those entities, in accordance with which a fictional entity is a compound entity equipped up from either a make-believe theoretical point and a suite theoretical point. the fictitious entity is built by means of imagining the life of someone with yes homes and including a set-theoretical point which include the set of houses reminiscent of the houses of the imagined entity.
Moreover, the e-book advances a brand new mixed semantic and ontological defence of the lifestyles of fictional entities.
Read Online or Download How Ficta Follow Fiction: A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities (Philosophical Studies, Volume 105) PDF
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Extra resources for How Ficta Follow Fiction: A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities (Philosophical Studies, Volume 105)
Yet how can he be a prince in the same sense as Charles, Prince of Wales? He also lives in Denmark, or so Shakespeare tells us. But how is it that if one had gone to Denmark, there would never have been the possibility of meeting him as there would be in respect of an actually existing real Dane? There is a traditional reply to this problem, which goes back to Meinong’s pupil Ernst Mally. In the abstractionist camp, it has appealed above all to Platonists. In this reply, it is not the case that Meinongian 52 Cf.
18 Although it has been merely sketched out, it is obvious that this theory would be able to account also for the “nonexistence” datum of fictional entities. According to the Meinongian phenomenological theory, fictional entities do not exist since they are außerseiende objects of our imagination. 16 Cf. Brentano (1924: 88). Brentano’s thesis is revived by Meinong (1971: 76). For such an elaboration, cf. Bencivenga (1985/6). 18 According to Kroon (1992), in the mature phase of his thought Meinong defended a similar theory: fictional beings “are there” insofar as they are posited by thought, and they possess properties ascribed to them in the relevant fiction insofar as it is pretended of them that they possess such properties.
Properties such as being round and being square, being golden and being a mountain, seem to be (as the early Russell would have said) existence-entailing properties: if an object has one of them it must actually exist. How, therefore, can a Meinongian object, which is außerseiend, have those properties? Insofar as it actually exists, Mont Blanc is a mountain. 51 Neo-Meinongian abstractionists try to answer this question by discarding Meinong’s Principle of Independence. As we have seen, for them Meinongian objects actually exist, in the non-spatiotemporal way that pertains to abstract entities.